Speculative Foundations of Metaphysical Theology in Hegel's Philosophy of Religion

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Abstract: Being a theologian by education and a philosopher by the nature of scientific activity, Hegel moved towards the synthesis of two spheres of knowledge. He developed his philosophy of Logos (λόγος) and Spirit (Geist), especially in its later versions, proceeding from the content of Christology. On the contrary, he sought to place purely theological problems, primarily related to the content of the proofs of the existence of God, on the foundations of metaphysics. The latter is understood in the article in the sense of Aristotle's "philosophia prima", that is, as the doctrine of higher principles, in other words, of the universal unity of thought and being. Thus, Hegel laid the speculative foundations of metaphysical theology. The concept of speculativeness is associated by the authors of the article, first of all, with the method of explication of the content of the identity of thinking and being, where the form of such explication is transcendental reflection, which reveals the universal content. In recent decades, the Hegelian philosophy of religion has served as one of the theoretical sources for the development of speculative theology in the Catholic and Protestant denominations.

1 INTRODUCTION

G.W.F. Hegel was a philosopher who never forgot his theological education. Moreover, the last decade of his work is characterized by an increase in interest in the problems of the philosophy of religion. This manifested itself in several courses of lectures on the philosophy of religion which Hegel delivered in 1821, 1824, 1825 and 1827 with an ever-evolving content, as well as in a course of lectures on the proofs of the existence of God in 1829. In the latter case, Hegel to some extent challenged public opinion. (JW von Goethe, for example, spoke directly about this in his conversations with JP Eckermann, since they saw in these proofs the outdated content of the old theology. Hegel, however, managed to revive the speculative meaning in them, referring to the philosophical principle of the identity of thinking and being.

With his lectures on the philosophy of religion, Hegel achieved at least three results: 1) In the field of philosophy, he decisively overcame the atheism of the Enlightenment and revived the Christian worldview on the basis of dialectical thinking; the Christological roots of his philosophy are especially clearly visible in the doctrine of the spirit, in the doctrine of history as Geschichte and especially in the repeatedly expressed parallels between the science of logic and the Christian doctrine of the Logos: "... logic in this sense is a metaphysical theology that considers the evolution of the idea God is in the ether of pure thought, so that it, in fact, only watches how this evolution takes place - evolution, in itself and for itself, resolutely independent, regarding them as the property of history". 2) In the field of religious studies, Hegel lays the foundations for the modern historical study of religions on the basis of a critical analysis of sources; according to modern researchers,

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Hegel sought to obtain the maximum amount of empirical knowledge in the field of the history of religion, and it was Hegel who possessed the largest religious material among his contemporaries. 3) In the field of theology, Hegel was able to take a decisive step towards the modernization of this science on the basis of the theoretical achievements of German idealism, i.e. a step towards its formation as a speculative theology, which has as its foundation the unity of thinking and being, thinking itself in a discursive rational form.

2 MATERIALS AND METHODS

The philosophy of Logos (λόγος) and Spirit (Geist), especially in its later versions, Hegel developed on the basis of the content of Christology. On the contrary, he sought to place purely theological problems, primarily related to the content of the proofs of the existence of God, on the foundations of metaphysics. The latter is understood in the article in the sense of Aristotle's "philosophia prima", that is, as the doctrine of higher principles, in other words, of the universal unity of thought and being. Thus, Hegel laid the speculative foundations of metaphysical theology.

To show the need to reconstruct the speculative foundations of metaphysical theology in Hegel's philosophy of religion in the context of modern philosophical discourse, the authors turn to the method of explication of the content of the identity of thinking and being, where the form of such an explication is transcendental reflection, which reveals the universal content in itself. In this regard, methodologically, this study uses a qualitative dialectical approach.

Thus, the religious manifests itself, first of all, in thinking, hence the Hegelian system represents the harmony between religion and philosophy. Thus, in the doctrine of the Trinity, he finds a dialectical scheme. The Divine develops in three forms (recognition of the trinity of God in Christianity and its denial in Judaism and Islam). That God can only be concretely conceived as Triune is Hegel's development of the ontological argument.

At the empirical level, the unity of the speculative foundations of Hegel's metaphysical theology and philosophy of religion is expressed in the law of religious complementarity. According to this law, the religious and secular speculative foundations of metaphysics, on the one hand, mutually exclude, and on the other hand, presuppose each other. When their polarization reaches its limit (apogee), the limit is the difference between the religious and secular metaphysical ideal. From this diagram it can be seen (Fig. 1) that the growth of faith in the natural person leads to a fall in faith in the supernatural person. But upon reaching a certain critical value (characterized in everyday life as a "spiritual crisis"), a turning point occurs, and then the fall of faith in the natural person naturally leads to an increase in faith in the supernatural person. But also, only up to a certain state, upon reaching which the reverse process begins. Thus, the ups and downs of both secular and religious ideals are manifested in the mutual transfer to each other of a kind of dialectical relay race of the "meaning of life".



Figure 2: Law of Religious Complementarity, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 - states of spiritual crisis; 6, 7, 8, 9 - states of an ideological turning point.

It is known that the dialectical method had a great influence on both the secular and theological study of the foundations of metaphysics and introduced new approaches to its description. In this regard, the authors of the article see in Hegel's system an opportunity to reconcile the theological content of the dogma with modern science.

3 RESULTS

The features of the philosophical rethinking of the foundations of traditional theology on the foundation of speculative metaphysics were clearly manifested primarily in the Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God, since it is here that Hegel, on the one hand, consciously does not go beyond the subject field of the old theology, and on the other hand, gives this content a fundamentally new interpretation in the spirit of German absolute idealism. Although Hegel considered all three theological proofs: cosmological, teleological and ontological, however, he specifically stipulated that only the last for him is the only true

one, and the first two, in essence, are reduced to the ontological.

The cosmological proof of the Being of God, by analyzing which Hegel opens the main content of his Lectures, hides the requirement to move from the “final definition” of the existence of a thing (“the beginning in them is something given”) to the “infinite” concept of pure being. "Starting point - empirical things and their whole - the world." The main premise of the cosmological proof is that finite things do not have the reason for their existence in themselves, the reason is outside them, in other things: "individual things do not come from themselves and do not go away from themselves." But the chain of an infinite series of causality must have a universal basis, if only because of the infinity that it is. Thus, the concept of cause necessarily presupposes the concept of causa sui, the concept of the finitude of a thing the concept of the infinity of the universal, and necessity turns out to be the truth of contingency. It was these logical categories (finite - infinite, accidental - absolutely necessary) that the old theologians used when constructing the cosmological proof of the Existence of God. From a purely theological point of view, the conclusion that we get as a result of the cosmological "proof" leads us to the idea of the power of God.

However, here Hegel points out that the very choice of these categories for carrying out the cosmological proof of the Existence of God, from the point of view of the science of logic, is random, and it does not matter what level of logical concreteness the final definition is taken. Hegel says that any category is suitable for this: "... other definitions are added here, and in general the number of such proofs can grow by dozens, because any stage of a logical idea can serve for this." Thus, it turns out that there are many "proofs" of the Existence of God. And in the end, the expanded form of cosmological proof is the whole of Hegel's logic, which represents a number of categories developing to the level of an "idea", passing into each other. In the understanding of the author of Science of Logic, speculative logic, like the cosmological and teleological proofs of the existence of God, contains the movement "from being to the idea of God." But at the same time, it is also the logic of movement, contained in the ontological proof of the Being of God, which goes "from the idea of God, the truth in itself, to the being of this truth." The science of logic is thus the representation of the idea of God, as Hegel himself speaks here. However, the idea of God is not yet God himself, and the logical representation of the idea of God is not yet an image of God himself.

It should be noted that it is I. Kant's criticism of the cosmological proof of the Existence of God that Hegel, for the most part, makes the object of his metacriticism. The cosmological proof reveals in the concept the necessity of the transition from the finite to the infinite. However, this transition is accessible only to speculative-logical thinking, capable of activity in the "space" of the original unity of thinking and being, i.e., to such an activity that is able to stay in the pure element of this unity and at the same time follow the impulse to difference contained in it. Only such thinking will be truly concrete, able to conceive of unity as a positive unity, or, as Hegel puts it, as an “affirmation”: “... the infinite is the affirmation of the finitude that cancels itself, the negation of negation, although mediated, but mediated only through the removal of mediation”. I. Kant, who insists that any knowledge is possible only in the form of experience, i.e., in a form that preserves the finiteness of the finite, he interprets the higher unity of thought and being only as an abstraction of the possibility of experience, which he also transfers to the sphere of the dialectic of the finite and the infinite, which constitutes the logical basis of the proofs of the Existence of God. Therefore, "his criticism of these evidence is not enough in itself, not to mention the fact that he did not understand the deeper basis of such evidence, and therefore failed to do justice to their true content."

The teleological proof of the existence of God, to the analysis of which Hegel proceeds, appears to him as a proof of a higher logical level in comparison with the cosmological proof. The “reflective faculty” that carries out teleological proof no longer rests on a randomly taken category of logic. The “supporting” category here can only be a concept that has reached the level of an idea, namely, the idea of life. For a cosmological proof, the logical content is still something external, so the choice of the initial category here is random, not mediated by the logical content itself. But if the teleological proof of the existence of God has a certain (and even one of the highest) categories of logic as its starting point and result, then the logical has entered into its content and to a large extent determines its development from the idea of the ultimate goal to the idea of the world soul, universal vitality.

The teleological proof is based on the implicative judgment that if the goal is understood in philosophy as the beginning of anything, then one must assume the ultimate universal goal of everything that exists. However, at the same time, teleological proof in its historical form proceeded from a purely mechanical connection of the concept of an end with a single thing. The transition from such goals to the universal,

which this proof claimed, looked, therefore, unconvincingly: “Goals, being divided, specializing, become something insignificant for themselves, we do not feel respect for them ...”. Hegel finds the true concept of a goal in the idea of a living organism, which he interprets as a "objective goal." At the same time, he refers to Aristotle's teaching about the soul as an entelechy, as well as Kant's teaching about expediency as an object of the reflective ability of judgment, which the Koenigsberg philosopher concretized in his Critique of the Ability of Judgment, referring to the idea of the organic, "where ends and means are not external to each other. friend, but the means produces the end and the end produces the means. Hegel himself developed the concept of the soul of a living organism as a "determined goal" in the "Phenomenology of Spirit", and a higher concept of life as an idea - in the "Science of Logic".

Hegel connects the transition to the concept of life as a stage in the development of an absolute idea with the idea of the world as a whole, constituting a single living organism. In substantiating his special hylozoism, Hegel puts forward an amazingly convincing judgment that inanimate matter exists in the world only in "essential conjugation" with life. The latter, therefore, is not something accidental or episodic, which means that expediency, as an internal definition of life, also constitutes an essential definition of the world as a whole: man to the extent that he partly belongs to living nature, partly sets himself special goals. All final expediency belongs to man. However, we can recall that Hegel considered the planets as an image of a living organism.

Thus, in full accordance with the spirit and letter of his teaching, Hegel looks at man as the highest manifestation of expediency in nature. The truth of the doctrine of the universal expediency of the world reveals the existence of God through the image and concept of man. This is exactly the course of Hegel’s thought in the Philosophy of Nature, where he speaks of man as the “climax” of nature and takes the human body as a model for expounding the concept of organic, since man is “a perfect animal in which organic principles are most fully revealed. and distinctly. In this higher organism there is a universal type, on which and from which alone the significance of an undeveloped organism can be recognized and deduced. Nature - through the involvement of the inanimate with the living, through the development of the living - focuses on man. In this context, the failure of the attempts of philosophy of the 21st century to construct some kind of ontology without a person is quite obvious. However, this kind of ontology became completely impossible after the Incarnation and the Ascension of the Lord.

The human soul for Hegel is the highest level of concentration of nature. This kind of anthropologized world is a living world. Hegel therefore speaks of the world of "absolute, universal expediency", while referring to the ancient concept of the cosmos, seeing in it "... a system in which everything is in essential conjugation with each other ...". Since this expediency at the level of the universal is realized in the unity of matter and form, and therefore it is relevant in the Aristotelian sense, insofar as the universal itself is a “presumptive goal”, organic life. In this context, Hegel speaks of “universal vitality”, “one universal life”, about the soul of the world.

Similarly, in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, the truth of "natural religions" (perceiving, according to Hegel, the divine and spiritual principles in natural images: sky, fetish, fire, images of sensuality, etc.) ultimately reveals itself through an appeal to the image person. This is how Hegel interprets the allegorical meaning of the sphinx: a human face escaping from an animal body, as well as the famous answer given to Oedipus to the riddle of the sphinx: "Man". These are images to which Hegel returns repeatedly, finding in them a special consonance with his understanding of the logic of the history of nature and spirit.

Hegel in the "Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences" reveals the transition from the organic soul of the "Philosophy of Nature" to the feeling (properly human) soul in "Anthropology" and from it to the concept of a free soul, an objective and absolute spirit. Following the same logic of the method, he also in the Philosophy of Religion passes from the religion of human individuality, which sees God in finite anthropological images, to the religion of the absolute spirit - to Christianity, which knows God in the person of Man, bearing infinite moral content.

It is easy to see that the logic of interpreting the evidence for the existence of God reproduces the general logical rhythm of the Hegelian system. Namely: cosmological proof, based on the interpretation of the logical categories of causality, necessity, chance, etc., in general, corresponds to the science of logic as the beginning of a philosophical system. With teleological proof, we move on to the problems of the philosophy of nature and philosophical anthropology with their teaching about the organic and anthropological soul, and about the soul of the world.

In the ontological proof, the problems of the absolute spirit as the most concrete form of the unity of thinking and being are actualized. Turning to the

language of theological concepts, Hegel gives a slightly different interpretation of the evidence: the cosmological proof of the existence of God leads us to the theological idea of the power of God, God the Father, and the result of the teleological proof for theology is the idea of the vitality of God, the God-man, taking into account all the diversity of the philosophical, theological and natural-scientific aspects of the concept of life.

Ultimately, Hegel led a critical analysis of the cosmological and teleological proofs of the existence of God to a critique of the method of thinking, which he associated with the old metaphysics and in which he saw, first of all, an unreflected mutual opposition of thinking and being, characteristic precisely for the historical stage of development of philosophy, which it had reached by era of the New Age. When Hegel explicates the logical meaning of these theological proofs of the existence of God, it becomes clear that for the very logical content the method of "proofs of the existence of God" is a pure historical form of chance. Firstly, insofar as the very formulation of the question of the transition from one logical category (from the finite to the infinite or from the accidental to the necessary) arose from the interest of the non-philosophical sphere of knowledge, namely from theology. Therefore, from the point of view of philosophical interest, the very form of the cognitive problem (about the existence of God) appears to be a converted form of the question of the universal unity of thought and being. Secondly, insofar as the requirements of the proof, i.e., rational, external mediation of content, also do not correspond to the philosophical stage of thinking, i.e., these demands appeal to philosophy, as it were, "from outside".

Of course, if we proceed from the understanding of the subject of philosophy as a universal unity of thought and being, then the most interesting will be the proof of the existence of God, which Hegel called proof of the true, of speculative interest, i.e., ontological proof. The essence of ontological proof is the necessary transition from the subjectively posited concept of God to the objectivity of God. It is here that the unity of thinking (about God) and being (God) must not only discover, reveal itself, but must also posit itself for consciousness as something directly given (which for the historical form of philosophy was fixed by the concept of “evidence”).

4 DISCUSSION

The ontological proof of the existence of God, formulated for the first time by Anselm of Canterbury, whom Hegel called a great, deep speculative thinker, played a fundamentally important role mainly in the philosophy of Descartes, which we will discuss in more detail below. Hegel specifically analyzes the Cartesian interpretation of the ontological proof in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy. However, in the Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God, Descartes, like Spinoza, is only briefly mentioned. But at the same time, Hegel constantly returns to the Eleatics and specifically dwells on Kant's criticism of the ontological proof. However, the analysis of the evidence for the existence of God in the Critique of Pure Reason is in itself a reflection on the historical forms of Cartesianism (including Wolffian metaphysics). Therefore, the Hegelian metacriticism of Kantian criticism implicitly includes the attitude towards the system of Descartes.

For speculative logic, the ontological proof of the existence of God, like the other two proofs, is of purely historical interest. As a material suitable for a constructive element of a philosophical system, they have remained in history. As already noted, the content that made up the logical meaning of the historical proofs of the existence of God - the unity of thinking and being in the mutual sublation and positing of each other by immediacy and mediation - is dissolved in the movement of the categories of the science of logic. The whole science of logic, in essence, is nothing but an explication of unity: on the one hand, the immediacy of the beginning and the immediacy of the result, and, on the other hand, the mutual mediation of the beginning and the result.

However, with regard to the ontological proof of the existence of God, this assessment, which limits its significance to historical interest, still seems to be not entirely accurate. The fact is that the explication of that logical content, which is indicated by the ontological proof of the existence of God, is absolutely necessary where the mediation of the simple immediacy of the beginning of the philosophical system and the immediacy of its result is in itself problematic, where this logical problem of the dialectic of mediation and immediacy is only posed and is only still waiting for its resolution, as was the case in the philosophical system of the Eleatics and Descartes.

Hegel's appeal to the Eleatics in the context of the problems of the ontological proof of the existence of God, of course, was not accidental. It is in Parmenides that we first find a kind of intellectual operation to posit the identity of thought and being as a direct identity, which for theology means the first step in developing the “toolkit” of the ontological proof of

the existence of God, and for philosophy it is the starting point for the formation of its historical and logical forms at the same time. The essence of this "intellectual operation" lies in the fact that in the act of negating the "thinking of non-existence", i.e., what is impossible to think, express, or name, a kind of “self-negation” of the thought of non-existence is carried out. The result of this negativity of thinking is the self-positing of the "thinking of being" as the absolute unity of being and thinking. An individual thinker, the same Parmenides, finds this content as something objective for himself, where the thinker himself only observes the negativity of thinking, which assumes the affirmativeness of its being.

The objectivity of the identity of thinking and being discovered by Parmenides is a condition for the possibility of concluding about the objectivity of our thoughts. However, by Parmenides himself, the negativity of thinking is not yet consciously defined as the inner content of being itself, as a kind of “reverse” (or “frontal”, which is all the same) side of being, which inevitably turns into an abstraction of unity itself: “In Parmenides, it is true , one can come across the definition of the One as thinking, or that the thinking is the existent, and Spinoza defines substance as the unity of being (extension) and thinking; but by this alone it cannot yet be said that being, or substance, is posited here as thinking, that is, as an activity that determines itself in itself, but the unity of being and thinking is still understood as One, immovable, ossified ... Here the One is not revealed explicitly as a self-developing necessity, is not revealed in accordance with how its concept was indicated, as a process that mediates it with itself in itself.

Movement in the definitions of the negativity of thinking constitutes an essential element of Descartes' philosophical system. The desire to unfold this negativity itself into a concrete process of thinking, to show its creative power, is already declared in Cartesian doubt itself. The radical doubt of Descartes, which denies any thought that does not contain the power of certainty of being, is a concretization of that process of self-negation of the thought of non-being, which we saw in Parmenides. However, if in the ancient philosopher we had the thought of being (and, accordingly, its self-negation) as something immediate, then the Cartesian doubt, postulated as the requirement of "obviousness", already includes mediation, and, therefore, includes the withdrawn knowledge of concreteness. absolute. “Evidence” is the idea of the immediate unity of thinking and being in a scientific position, but since this position has a special, and not universal content, this immediacy can only be a “posited” immediacy. More precisely, it can only be the result of reflection. The result of radical doubt in Descartes, as well as the result of the self-negation of thought in Parmenides, was the discovery of the universal unity of thought and being. However, since the very process of denying non-existent thought contained reflection, determined by all the experience of previous philosophy from Socrates to Gregory the Theologian, insofar as being was revealed here not as an object presenting the thoughts of a person, a philosopher, but as a subject.

In the position "Cogito ergo sum", as the highest foundation of science, Descartes fixes the absolute identity of thinking and being. But unlike Parmenides, this identity is posited and considered not as being, one with thinking, but as thinking, which is directly being. With some simplification, we can say that identity is seen by the philosopher not from the side of being, but from the side of thinking. We note once again that this approach is not the fruit of an arbitrary attitude of the scientist, his kind of whim. It turned out to be possible only insofar as the objective unity of thinking and being was mediated by thinking in the historical process of the development of philosophy. The definitions given by thinking that has its own negativity as its starting point and moves in this negativity can only be definitions of reflection. After all, reflective thinking is the movement of the essence "from nothing to nothing, and thus the movement back to itself", due to which the unity of thinking and being is posited as “negative conjugation with oneself”.

In the Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God, Hegel, commenting on this relation of subjectivity and objectivity in the identity of thinking and being, wrote: “The ancients did not know such a transition; for it to be, the deepest descent of the spirit into itself is required. When the spirit matures to its greatest freedom, to subjectivity, it first comprehends the thought of God as a subjective thought, and for the first time comes to this opposition of the subjective and the objective. In Descartes' philosophy, pure thinking itself, taken as a starting point and possessing the qualities of activity and self-determination, made it possible to assume its identity with being not only in the form of an object, but also in the form of a subject. However, the achievement of this principle of philosophy, which is deeper in comparison with antiquity, also contained a new challenge, because. now it was required of thinking to deduce (deduce) from its own content the definitions of the objectivity of thinking and being.

Descartes could not solve this problem, just as Parmenides could not, due to the initial abstractness

of the thought about being, solve the problem of the unity and plurality of being. The absolute subject of Descartes, which became the starting point of the new philosophy, was only posited by him, and therefore abstract in its content. It could not be otherwise, since we are at the starting point of a new philosophy. The concretization of this principle became possible thanks to the centuries of reflective thinking of philosophers from Descartes himself to Leibniz and Wolff. And only after that Kant set the task of explicating the concreteness of the subject, and Fichte - to deduce from this concreteness all the objective foundations of science.

In the subject itself, marked by the aphorism "Cogito ergo sum", neither the objectivity contained in it, nor the necessity of its positing, is manifested. Descartes rightly connects the impulse to this objectivity with the absolute nature of the subject, but does so in a completely indistinct way. Therefore, the call for help to the ontological proof of the existence of God at this historical stage of philosophy is completely similar to Anaxagoras' Deus ex machina. It is correct that the development of thinking should result in the idea of objectivity as actual objectivity itself. But the process of this thinking is only postulated, not expounded by Descartes. As a result, the postulation of the objective identity of two substances, thinking and extension, required Descartes to incorporate non-philosophical content into his philosophy. Namely: the mythology of God. And no one can say that we are dealing here with a theological content and that Descartes is talking about the living God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. Thus, in the philosophy of Descartes, only the logical, and not the theological content of the ontological proof of the existence of God matters.

It is this logical content of the ontological proof of the existence of God in the metaphysics of modern times that is criticized by Kant in his transcendental dialectic, and this criticism, in turn, becomes the object of Hegel's metacriticism. Kant postulates a gap between thinking and being, which he sees in the proofs of the existence of God, especially in the ontological proof. Thought about an object does not yet mean its existence. The famous example of 100 thalers says that if I think they exist, the coins will not appear in my pocket. There is nothing to object to this criticism if we understand by though only a certain individual judgment, a reflection of experience. But this is not at all what the philosophers had in mind when they spoke of the thinking of being as the only true thinking. The 100 thalers argument may be valid within the four walls of domestic use, but it loses its force in the face of universal entities. So, if we move from a judgment about thalers as material coins (and even about thalers as a social relation) to a discussion of the problems of morality, morality, law, then the line between the conceivable and the real becomes very blurry. If I admit the possibility that I have not only 100 thalers of Kant, but also 30 pieces of silver of Judas, if I think of their beings?

According to Manfred Holzleitner, Hegel alone is credited for revealing the greatness and limits of the ontological argument. “But he was able to do this only insofar as he recognized the abstract, analytical identity of thinking and being as such in Anselm’s arguments and understood the need to expand this thought, true in itself, to a synthetic and absolute identity”. Giving Anselm's proof such a form of development, Hegel, in the opinion of the German theologian, just proves the need to understand God as a spirit, which M. Holzleitner considers one of the final tasks of the Science of Logic: “It was the Science of Logic that showed in its end not only a return to the immediacy of being, which is now conceived as a fulfilled being, but also the need to expand to the trinitarian system as a whole. Not only does the vitality, the reality, as well as the truth of the ontological proof depend on this point - here the Hegelian system as a whole is resolved. The logical conception of God as an absolute idea conceived itself as something else. That God can be concretely conceived only as the Triune is Hegelian development of the ontological proof”.

It is natural that a number of researchers develop the views of the German theologian. So, according to O. Panova, the philosopher's key questions about the consubstantiality of Language and Spirit reveal the specifics of the Hegelian understanding of the deeply spiritual nature of language. Hence, the high importance of Hegel's "lessons" in modern philosophical discourse and the need to accept them for the development of the sciences of man as a whole.

The very possibility of an ontological proof of the existence of God, according to Hegel, is determined by the concrete understanding of the unity of thought and being, the theoretical expression of which he saw in the science of logic. Hegel sets forth the interpretation of this concreteness in detail in his theory of the logical concept and in his doctrine of the concept of absolute spirit. Since the presentation of this issue in the Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God would lead away from the main problems of the latter, Hegel can only outline this content in the most general terms, referring the listener to his main works. Hegel is right in arguing that the problem of ontological proof is resolved

when we understand that its starting point is not abstract immediacy (I, being, etc.), as both Descartes and Kant saw, but when the starting point is concrete "concept", which carries the process of removing the opposition of the subjective and the objective, the direct and the mediated. Such an approach is justified for a philosopher who, at the level of logical philosophy, overcomes all the transformed forms of the unity of thinking and being that have taken place in the history of philosophy.

At the same time, we must not forget that in historical form - both among the Eleatics and Descartes - there was a pure immediacy of the unity of thinking and being. And the whole problem of philosophical knowledge, which was resolved by the subsequent historical development of philosophy, consisted precisely in the positing of its mediation. Therefore, Hegel justifiably appeals to the “concept” and “spirit” if he follows the interest of theological discipline: to preserve in the theological circulation (primarily for propaedeutic purposes) the content and form of the proof of the existence of God. The interest of proper philosophical knowledge is to consider the process of becoming a reflection of the unity of thinking and being in the history of philosophy. And for this it is necessary, first of all, to take into account the peculiarities of the historical forms of philosophy, fixing the immediacy of this unity as simple immediacy, including in the form of proofs of the existence of God. In this case, the appeal to the “concept” proposed by the philosopher seems unnecessary due to the fact that the very form of evidence for the existence of God turns out to be indifferent to the cognitive interest of philosophy.

5 CONCLUSIONS

In his speculative philosophy, Hegel gives an example of a meaningful synthesis of diverse content, designed to express the essence and meaning of the highest unity - the universal unity of thought and being. This unity allows him to raise the question of the most important subject, of absolute truth. He also addresses this topic in his Lectures. It focuses the main thing: the meaning of philosophy (including the works of Hegel himself) for a person, for his personality, for self-consciousness and for his very life. Hegel again, as in other works, repeats that philosophy is the knowledge of absolute truth. But when we get acquainted with the text of the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion and the Lectures on the Proof of the Existence of God, we understand what the absoluteness of truth meant to him. According to Hegel, philosophy comprehends absolute truth not because it supposedly closes with itself and has nothing more to know. For Hegel, truth is absolute only because it is the truth of Christ. Philosophical thinking and theology do not merge, but become open to each other. It is this successful synthesis of philosophy and theology, carried out by a German thinker 200 years ago, that has been considered by representatives of the Catholic and Protestant denominations in recent decades as an instructive example of the development of speculative theology.

A number of unresolved problems remained outside the attention of the authors of the article, such as “being as positing and reality in the speculative theology of Hegel and early Kant”, “the removal of religion in philosophy according to Hegel as the removal of religious representation in speculative symbolism”, “Hegel’s concept of the speculative foundations of metaphysical theology in post-Hegelian philosophy”, etc. In the future, this issue will be reflected in future studies.

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